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INTRODUCTION
The State misulentilies the law in arguing that indigent criminal defendants ha\e
in* constitutional right to maintain an existing attorney/client relationship. The State
urges tins Court to overrule \rem !ie\ in which this Court established an indigent
defendant's constitutional right to retain counsel. In place of that right, the State
proposes allow mg it to inlcrferc with allornc\ /client relationships whene\ er a
"reasonable possibiliW ol a conflict o\ interest exists. Although indigent detendaiits
ma\ not select a specific lawyer to represent them, the United States Supreme Court has
established indigent criminal defendants' right to retain appointed counsel. The State's
proposed low threshold for rcmo\ me defense counsel won Id discourage competent
counsel from accepting appointments in capital cases, contradict numerous state courts'
con trap, conclusions, and \ lolate the ABA ( iuidelines lor capital cases. I he State would
also be free to sp\ on defense teams aiul arrest their members as was done iti this ease.
ARGUMENT
IN ARGUEEEES THIS COURT CORR1X LEY
ESTABLISHED HI E SAME CONSTITUTIONAL RIG HI
TO RETAIN CHOSEN (OUNSEE THAT THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT EOUNI) IN WHEAT.
Contrary to (he Stale's assertions, the United States Supreme Court has not
rejected indigent delendants' right to continued representation by a specific law_\er.
Rather, the Supreme Court A decision in Wheat \. I nitt d St(aes. 4X6 U.S. 153 i I9XX i.
remains the constitutional standard when the prosecution seeks to interlere with an
indigent person's relationship u ith appointed counsel. In State v. Argn< lit w 2003 I' I 1.
T'|jX~-X9. 65 173d ^ M. this Court correct K applied Wln/at's limited constituti<>nal right to
retain chosen counsel. Not onl\ does the Slate fail to provide an\ reasoned basis tor
clim mating this constitutional rig lit. the survi\al of the rights to a fair trial and
independent delense counsel require protection trom unwarranted prosecutorial
interference. (!i\cn the compelling reasons to secure the attorney-client relationship and
this Court's wcll-tounded reliance on Wheat, no justification supports o\erruluig
Amju'lh's' right to "be represented b\ an attorne\ ot one's choosing." Ar^ut !!e\. 2005
IT l.'!!X7. (^ PA1 751.
A. Wheat's Eslahlishinent of Indiuent Criminal
Petendants." ConstitutionaI Riyjit to Retain
Chosen Counsel Controls 'Ehis Appeal.
In conflict with Wheat the State unabashed I\ urecs this Court to oxerrule
Argut //( ^' constitutional rnelit to retain etiosen counsel. State's Uriel at 1> 1X A: n.4. In
place o\ Ar^uelles. the Stale seeks the abilil\ to disrupt the attorne\-client relationship
w henexer a "'reasonable possibiliiC of a conflict ol interest may exist. State's Brie! at
14-22.5". The State's onh justification for o\eriurning this precedent is its claim that
the United States Supreme Court has rejected indigent criminal dclendants' right to retain
chosen counsel. State's Brief at 16.
1 he State errs in this assertion. Recently, in I nited Slatt s i. (io/i:n!c:-I.<<p't:. 126
S.Ct. 2557. 165 E.Ed.2d 409 (2()06i. the Supreme Court reaffirmed that Wheat controls
an indigent defendant's right to maintain a relationship with appointed counsel. I he
criminal delemlant in (lonzalez-I "/»< : privately retained an out-ot-stalc attorney to
represent him in a criminal matter. I26 S.Ct. at 2560. When the retained attorney
\ lolaled a court ruling, the federal district court judge revoked the out ol-state attorney s
pro hat i /i c status. Id. The delctulant objected and later appealed the district court
judge's decision. I lie Supreme (\iurt ruled that the right to retain an attorney was so
fundamental to a fair trial and essential to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel that the
deprivation e\ those rights constituted structural error. Id. at 2564.
In doing so. the Court limited it's holding to non-indigent defendants and
commented that Uheat controlled "defendants who require counsel to he appointed lor
them." hi. at 256.7. Speeificalb , citing Uheat, the ('ourt reaffirmed that criminal
defendants ma\ not "insist i^n representation by a person who is not a member ol the bar.
>r demand that a court honor a w uivcr of conflict tree representation." Id. at 2x66.
Rather, the Court, rely ing again on Uht at. held that trial courts have a dut\ to ensure that
'"criminal trials are conducted w ithin the ethical standards oi the profession and that
legal proceedings appear lair to all who observe them."" Id. (quoting Wheat. 4X6 U.S. at
160). (ionzah :-Lopez, thus, confirms thai Uheat remains the test for protecting an
indigent defendant's right to retain appointed counsel.
Because Arunelle.s rests on Wheat, the State erroneously urges this Court to
overrule Ar^nt lies. Subject to the limitations enumerated in (fonz<dez-I-op< z. WIn at
established a Sixth Amendment "right to select and be represented by one's preferred
attorncv ...."' 4X6 U.S. at 159. Klenticallv. in Arguelles this Court acknow ledged
Wluat as recognizing "a limited right to select and be represented by an attorney ot one's
choosing . . . ." 2005 UT 1. l|[XA 65 17 nl ~ A . And. just as this Court ruled in Amjuelies.
Win at invoked a "Sixth Amendment presumption in lav or of counsel ot choice." 4X6
U.S. at 160. Thus, contrary to (he Stale's aigumcnts, Uheat establishes indigent criminal
detendaiits' constitutional right to retain chosen counsel. Because no reason supports the
State's request to overrule Argm //ew this Court should decline to do so.
The State's arguments further misapprehend other related Supreme Court cases.
In (lonzalczd.opcz. that Court claritied that ( apiin Cv Drxsdaie v. I nited States. 49!
U.S. 617 i I9X9). and Morris v. Siappx. 46 I U.S. 1 (I 9X ^>, stand tor the uncontested
propositions that trial courts have "power to enlorce rules or adhere to practices that
determine which attorneys mav appear he tore [thein|. or to make scheduling and otln
iecisions that effectively exclude a defendant's first choice of counsel." 126 S.Ct. 2.766t
(emphasis added). As this analysis demonstraighls. these cases (.U^ not affirmatively
reject indigent defendants' right to retain appointed counsel. Set Anne Bowen Poulin.
Strengthening the Criminal Defendant's Ri^ht to counsel. 28 Cardozo E. Rev. 1213.
125 1-54 i2O06); see also Wavne I). Holly. Rethinking the Sixth Amendment For the
Indigent ('nmimd Dcfcinlant: Do R< imhurst nn nt Statntt s Support Rci o<zuttion ot a
R'mjil to Counsel of'Choice Jor the Indigent'.'. 64 Brook. I.. Rev. 1X1 <I99X) tdiscussing
right to retain counsel).
In contrast to the initial appointment o\ counsel discussed in those cases, this
appeal addresses the constitutional right of protecting dclendanls trom Slate interlere
with an existing attorney-client relationship. UACI )I. does not contest that indigent
criminal defendants have no right to be appointed a specific attorney. Rather, it has
argued both in its motion and memorandum in the trial court and in this appeal that
Win at and Ar^uclles constitutionally require trial judges to presume that once counsel is
appointed, an indigent defendant may retain thai attoiney. UACDI ."s Brief at 6-9, "I his
presumption mav oniv be overcome bv a demonstration ol an actual conlliet or a
show mg o\ a serious potential conflict." ArgmJIcs. 2005 UT 1. ({[S7. 6 ^ P.3d 73 1. The
State's proposed "reasonable possibility" test tails short of this constitutional standard.
IE The Essential Importance of Protecting the
Independence of the A1101 ney-Client
Relationship Demands Affirminu Wheat and
Arxuelles.
Retaining Uheat and Argimlh \ are not only constitutionally mandated but
adopting the Slate's proposed "reasonable possibility" (est would lead to unlair trials and
denials o\ the right to counsel. As detailed in UAC 'I )l 5s original brief, many state courts
recognize the dangers of easily allow ing the prosecution to disrupt the attorney-client
relationship, especially in death penalty cases. UAC '1)1 5s Brief at 6-9. IX-27. The risk
ot criminal delcndants losing trust in their appointed attorneys and the real tear ot
dissuading deleiise attorneys from representing capital delcndants provide strong support
lor removing defense counsel in rare circumstances. Indeed, the State devotes a
significant portion of its brief recognizing the need lor restraint. State's Bnel at 22 2 •.
The Slate's ov\ n acknowledgment ol the risk ot unwarranted interference in the attorney
cli enl relationship demonstrates the inadequacy of its proposed "reasonable possibility"
test
The primary defect in the State's reasoning rests on the ease m wInch the State
proposes to wield its ability to raise potential conflicts ot interests and to interlere in the
attorney-client relationship. Should this Court uphold the State's and the trial court's
\ lew that a mere possibility ol a conflict supports icuiov mg deterge counsel, this ( our!
can expect prosecutorial interference to become much more common. Stati v. Hii\ke\.
X2 SAW 3d 29A 4)5 09 (4'enn. Cum. App. 2002 i: Stcames v. Clinton, "xo S.W.2d 2 16.
225 (Tex. Crim. App. I9X9|. UACIM has observed that since the arrest of Richaid
Mauro and Ted Cilwick and the prolracied litigation that has ensued fewer and fewer of
its members are willing to accept appointments in capital cases. The State's eflorts to
establish a low threshold tor removing defense counsel indicates that delcnsc lawyers'
concerns tor interlcrence are well-bumdcd.
The State also minimizes the ovcrw helming number of state courts that hav e
agreed to discourage motions to remove delcnsc counsel. In addition to the cases cited in
UAC4)15 s original brief, numerous oilier state courts have ruled that the attorney-client
relationship is "in\ iolalc" and entitled to constitutional protection. MeKinnon r. Stiite.
526 P.2d IX. 2 3 (Alaska 197 In CUmnits \. State. XI 7 S.W.2d 194. 19X-200 iArk.
199 1i: W:avt r v. State. X94 So. 2d US. 1XX ilia. 2004 i: Reoph v. Davis. 4-19 N.E.2d
237.241 iIll.App. 19X3):////va7.A.5A400NAY.2d 147. 152 (Minn. App. 19X7). In
addition to due process and Sixth Amendment grounds, these eases have relied on the
same equal protection concerns that I AUDI, raised in the trial court and in its appellate
brief and winch the State dismisses on appeal. UACDE Uriel" at 7 iciting Smith v.
Superior Court. 440 P.2d 65. 74 (Cab 196Xn; State's Uriel'at 19-21; see MeKinnon. 526
172d at 2 3 (citing Smith): ( lenu nt^. XI ." S.W .2d at 199- 200 (rely ing on Smith v. W<avt r.
X94 So. 2d at 1XX-X9 (citing equal protection concerns!: Davis. 449 \\E.2d at 24 1
irclvinu on Smith): M.R.S.. 100 NAY.2d at 1.72 trelvine on Smith). Although the State
mav be entitled to some sav in how state funds are Used when appointing counsel, these
cases establish the necessity ol limiting the State's ability to interfere with delcnsc
counsel. Moreover. regardless ol the source ol these courts base their rulings on
constitutional or policy concerns, the sheer number ol state courts that have recognized
the potential tor unwarranted prosecutorial interference and state discrimination based on
poverty is persuasive.
As further supports for limiting the state Iroin mterlcrmg with delcnsc counsel,
the ABA (iuidelines on capital representation impose strong limits on prosecutorial
intcrlcivnce in death penalty cases. In contrast, the Slate regards the ABA Guidelines as
mere guides and not requirements. State's Brief at 24-25. To the contrary. both this
Court and the Supreme Court have endorsed those guidelines as the minimal standards
for representation in capita! cases. Ri>mpilht v. Bt ard. 545 U.S. 374. I24 S.Ct. 2456.
2466 (2005): Wiggins v. Smith. 7 39 U.S. 510. 522 (2003); Mcnz.ies v. Galetka. 2006 U'l
Nl.'IN). l50PAd 4X0.
Rather than arresting defense team members who diligently attempt to lollow the
ABA (iuidelines. the State should encourage adherence to those minimal standards as a
means ot ensuring (he fairness and integrity ol capital prosecutions. As Mr. Maughan
indicates in his replv brief, the ABA Guidelines specilically direct delcnsc teams to
employ two team members to avoid the very claims the Stale is now raising. Maughan
Replv Brief at "-S. Nevertheless, the State dismisses this textbook example ^A
conducting capital investigations.
Ianally. the States request to overrule Arguas minimises its role in creating the
alleged con Ibet in this case . It argues that it had "no control" over Mr. Mauro's and Mr.
Cilw ick's unfounded arrests. State's Uriel" at 27 28. To the contrary. UAUDE docs not
allege that the states attorney in the appeal orchestrated the events below. Rather, the
record demonstrates that jail personnel in Bo\ Elder County listened in on priv deged
attorney-client communications between defense counsel and Mr. Maughan and then
mlormed Spokane police ol hcials that the defense team would be interv iew ing speedic
witnesses the next dav. Spokane police then approached these witnesses and pressured
them into claiming witness tampering against the defense team. After the dentense team
endored further allegation ol witness tampering, other talso charges followed, including
the lantastical claim that Mr. Mauio posed as a television news reporter. Then, the
prosecutors in the trial court ratified this ollieial misconduct and attempted to remove
delcnsc counsel, flic Attorney General's ol lice now advances and endorses the Slate
()ff iciak conduct. The State's role in this case, through these various actors, is sell-
ev ident.
CONCLUSION
'1 o ensure the sanctity ot the attorney-client relationship. U.AC 1)1. requests th IS
Court to reverse the district court's ruling disquahlv ing one ol the detense attorney s but
allow me: the other defense counsel to remain on the case.
Dated this I A day ol September. 20(f
KbNflV \i\\i'
\y' -tVi
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